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This paper addresses the regulatory challenges wrought by the increasing amount of 
human subject drug testing conducted in developing countries in support of new drug 
applications to the Food and Drug Administration.  Specifically, it examines the difficulty of 
enforcing the “informed consent” requirement for ethical scientific research performed in foreign 
territory.  In poorer regions, a lack of government oversight, lower regulatory standards, and 
barriers to communication have too frequently resulted in allegations of human experimentation 
performed without its participants’ informed consent.  In order to solve this problem, some 
commentators have suggested that the FDA could apply its human subject protections to foreign 
clinical research, and enforce them through injunctions or criminal prosecutions.  However, the 
international legal limits on states’ prescriptive jurisdiction may prohibit this exercise of 
extraterritoriality.  After analyzing the proposed extraterritorial regulation of foreign drug testing 
under the traditional bases and limitations of prescriptive jurisdiction, this paper concludes that 
such regulation would likely violate international law.  However, because nonconsensual clinical 
research has previously been regarded as a crime against humanity, the FDA might be able to 
bring criminal prosecutions under the principal of “universal jurisdiction” against investigators 
or sponsors who conducted studies without their subjects’ informed consent.  This analysis offers 
both positive and normative conclusions regarding the international legal system and the human 
rights regime.
 
  
1 
An Extraterritorial FDA: Could the Food and Drug Administration Apply Its Informed Consent 
Requirement Abroad Consistent with International Law? 
I. Introduction 
The modern pharmaceutical industry has become a “global enterprise.”
1  So too has the 
clinical testing process for new drugs.  Pharmaceutical companies based in developed countries 
increasingly use the citizens of the developing world as their human test subjects.
2  “[R]ich 
countries have the drugs and hypotheses, while poor countries have vast numbers of patients.”
3   
When the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) first promulgated its regulatory 
framework for new drug testing in 1962,
4 government officials hesitated to accept the results of 
foreign research trials, and so pharmaceutical companies rarely sponsored clinical studies 
abroad.
5  But the FDA has since liberalized its position on foreign research.
6  In response, 
                                                 
1 Ileana Dominguez-Urban, Harmonization in the Regulation of Pharmaceutical Research and 
Human Rights: The Need to Think Globally, 30 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 245, 245 (1997). 
2 See William Dubois, New Drug Research, The Extraterritorial Application of FDA 
Regulations, and the Need for International Cooperation, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 161, 167 
(2003). 
3 Mary Pat Flaherty & Doug Struck, Life by Luck of the Draw, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2000, at 
A1. 
4 See 27 Fed. Reg. 7990 (Aug. 10, 1962), 28 Fed. Reg. 179 (Jan. 8, 1963). 
5 PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW 650 (3d ed. 2007).  See also Office of 
Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services, The Globalization of Clinical 
Trials: A Growing Challenge in Protecting Human Subjects, Sept. 2001, at 6, available at  
2 
pharmaceutical companies have moved their clinical testing overseas, attracted by the more 
permissive regulation of human experimentation and lower research costs abroad.
7  Thus, in 
1999, nearly 27 percent of new drugs approved for sale in the United States were first tested in 
foreign countries,
8 and by 2008, that number had more than doubled to 80 percent.
9  In fact, the 
FDA approved ten new drug applications in 2008 based entirely on foreign data – without a 
single clinical study conducted in the United States.
10 
  The globalization of clinical testing for new drugs has generated an array of problems for 
                                                 
http://oig.lls.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-00-00190.pdf (“Until recently, almost all of the clinical drug 
research submitted in support of NDAs was conducted at sites within the U.S.”). 
6 In 1975, the FDA announced that it would not discriminate between foreign and domestic 
clinical studies, see 38 Fed. Reg. 24220 (Sept. 6, 1973); 40 Fed.Reg. 16053 (Apr. 9, 1974), and 
in 1994 the agency specified that it would accept new drug applications based entirely on foreign 
data.  See 21 C.F.R. § 314.106(b)(1) (1994). 
7 See Mary Pat Flaherty et al., Testing Tidal Wave Hits Overseas, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 2000, at 
A1.  Pharmaceutical companies increasingly conduct these foreign studies in developing regions 
like India, Africa, Eastern Europe, and Latin America.  See Yevgenia Shtilman, Pharmaceutical 
Drug Testing in the Former Soviet Union, 29 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 425, 434 (2009). 
8 Id. 
9 Gardiner Harris, Concern Over Foreign Trials for Drugs Sold in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 
2010, at A14.  Seventy-eight percent of the human subjects involved in those trials were enrolled 
in research sites abroad.  Id. 
10 Id.  Consider that such an application would have been automatically rejected only 14 years 
earlier.  
3 
the United States, home to the largest pharmaceutical industry in the world.
11  Concern over 
whether researchers abroad properly obtain patients’ “informed consent” poses one such 
challenge.
12 The principle of informed consent, dating back to the Nuremberg Trials after World 
War II,
13 forms one of the “basic ethical protections for research involving human 
participants.”
14  It requires that “a subject/patient willingly verifies his/her willingness to 
participate in a particular treatment, after having been informed of all aspects which are pertinent 
to that treatment and relevant to the subject's participation.”
15  Thus, in 1962, in the same bill 
                                                 
11 See Dominguez-Urban, supra note 1, at 245. 
12 Of course, ethical concerns are not the only problem wrought by globalized clinical testing. 
For instance, foreign governments may allow for less rigorous experimental methodologies, 
which in turn could produce less reliable data by which to evaluate a drug’s safety or 
effectiveness. See John Carroll, HHS report underscores big shift to foreign drug trials, 
FIERCEBIOTECH (June 22, 2010, 11:39 AM), http://www.fiercebiotech.com/story/hhs-report-
underscores-big-shift-foreign-drug-trials/2010-06-22.  Moreover, if certain drugs produced 
different reactions in different ethnic groups, or were especially sensitive to differing dietary or 
lifestyle factors, then they might provoke unexpected side effects when tested abroad but 
consumed in the United States.  See Dominguez-Urban, supra note 1, at 263 – 64. 
13 See Jennifer J. Couture, The Changes in Informed Consent in Experimental Procedures: The 
Evolution of a Concept, 1 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 125, 127 - 29 (2005). 
14 Maxwell J. Mehlman & Jessica W. Berg, Human Subjects Protections in Biomedical 
Enhancement Research, 36 J. L. MED & ETHICS 546, 552 (2008). 
15 Couture, supra note 13, at 126 n. 6. States prescribe varying processes for obtaining a research 
subject’s informed consent. See generally id.  
4 
where Congress first mandated that new drugs be clinically tested prior to marketing,
16 Congress 
also instructed that this newly required human experimentation occur only with the “informed 
consent” of its subjects.
17  Senator Jacob Javits of New York, sponsor of the informed consent 
amendment, noted the absence of state statutes covering informed consent in human subject 
research,
18 and explained the importance of such a requirement: 
I am for experimentation.  I feel deeply that some risks must be assumed in 
experimentation.  But we must hold the balance between personal dignity and personal 
responsibility and the right of the individual to know how his life is being disposed of, at 
least with his consent, and the virtues of the experimentation.
19 
In the absence of an informed consent requirement, Senator Javits asked, “[W]here is the dignity, 
the responsibility, and the freedom of the individual?”
20 
Yet a series of headline cases recently revealed that pharmaceutical companies seeking 
FDA approval of new drugs repeatedly failed to obtain patients’ informed consent in the course 
of conducting clinical trials in developing countries.
21  In these less developed regions, where an 
                                                 
16 Pub.L. No. 87–781, 76 Stat. at 780 (amending, inter alia, 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(7)). 
17 Pub.L. No. 87–781, 76 Stat. at 780 (amending, inter alia, 21 U.S.C. § 355(i)(4)). 
18 108 CONG. REC. 17,395 (1962) (statement of Sen. Javits), reprinted in 22 A LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG & COSMETIC ACT  AND ITS AMENDMENTS, at 323 (1979). 
19 108 CONG. REC. 17,397 (1962) (statement of Sen. Javits), reprinted in 22 A LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG & COSMETIC ACT  AND ITS AMENDMENTS, at 325 (1979). 
20 Id. 
21 See, e.g., Karen De Young et al., Latin America Is Ripe for Trials, and Fraud, WASH. POST., 
Dec. 21, 2000, at A1 (reporting on the criminal investigation surrounding a study sponsored in  
5 
increasing amount of human experimentation occurs, government regulators are “generally ill-
equipped to oversee, much less manage, the clinical trials being held within their borders.”
22   
Moreover, poorer countries have “strong incentives to encourage leniency in national and local 
oversight of the research” in order to attract drug companies.
23  The “resulting ‘regulatory 
vacuum’ makes it difficult for these countries to ensure the welfare of trial participants,”
24 and 
allows researchers to violate, whether intentionally or accidentally, the fundamental ethical 
                                                 
Argentina by drug manufacturer Hoecht Marion Roussel, in which researchers forged consent 
forms in order to administer the experimental drug cariporide to patients without their consent, 
resulting in the deaths of several participants); John Pomfret & Deborah Nelson, An Isolated 
Region’s Genetic Mother Lode, WASH. POST., Dec. 20, 2000, at A1 (describing a study 
sponsored in China by U.S. pharmaceutical company Millennium Pharmaceuticals, Inc., in 
which researchers made false promises of free healthcare to impoverished Chinese participants, 
without properly explaining the purpose of the experiment, in order to draw their blood for 
genetic study); Sharon LaFraniere et al, The Dilemma: Submit or Suffer, WASH. POST., Dec. 19, 
2000, at A1 (recounting American pharmaceutical company Pfizer, Inc.’s clinical trial of the 
anti-psychotic drug Zeldox at a Bulgarian mental institution, in which researchers failed to 
inform participants that the FDA had expressed concern over the drug’s effect on hearth rhythms 
and had refused to approve the drug until more safety tests had been conducted). 
22 See Shtilman, supra note 7, at 434 – 36. 
23 See id. 
24 See id. at 436.  
6 
principle of informed consent.
25  In fact, pharmaceutical companies sometimes conduct drug 
trials abroad precisely to avoid the more stringent U.S. regulations on human experimentation.
26  
Additionally, language barriers and cultural differences make it difficult for researchers to 
adequately explain the risks of the experimental process and ensure that participants have 
autonomously consented.
27  Even when obvious ethical violations do not occur, local variations 
in acceptable experimental procedures still invite accusations of exploitation.
28  Recently, the 
U.S. Embassy in Beijing went so far as to “warn[] U.S. medical researchers against working in 
impoverished, rural areas of China,” where “health care is poor and people are unable to protect 
their rights.”
29 
                                                 
25 See Dominguez-Urban, supra note 1, at 270 - 71. To appreciate the scale of these violations, 
consider a 1996 study by the Catholic University medical school in Santiago, Chile, which 
revealed that nearly half of the 44 clinical trials conducted in the country that year suffered from 
“ethical problems,” most commonly a lack of patients’ consent.  See LaFraniere et al, supra note 
21. 
26 See Dubois, supra note 2, at 168. 
27 See LaFraniere et al, supra note 21. 
28 See Dubois, supra note 2, at 168.  For instance, American pharmaceutical company Bristol-
Myers sponsored a clinical study in Budapest of an anti-psychotic drug tested on mental patients 
confined to locked wards – a standard practice in Hungary that would not have been acceptable if 
performed in the United States due to the fear of coercing consent.  See LaFraniere et al, supra 
note 21. 
29 Pomfret & Nelson, supra note 21 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Indeed, the lack of 
healthcare in poor countries may undermine the entire concept of “informed consent,” as  
7 
There are currently no effective mechanisms to enforce the informed consent requirement 
worldwide.  No international treaties regulate human experimentation.
30  The international codes 
of ethics that protect human test subjects – the Nuremberg Code
31 and the Declaration of 
Helsinki
32 – both require patients’ informed consent, but lack any sanctions or enforcement 
mechanisms.
33  The FDA does not use injunctions or criminal proceedings to enforce its 
informed consent requirement abroad.  Instead, the FDA simply refuses to accept data submitted 
in support of new drug applications if it originated from foreign research conducted without the 
subjects’ informed consent.
34  This purely ex post approach does not protect the victims, nor 
                                                 
participants could be so desperate for medical care that they would agree to any experimental 
procedure.  See LaFraniere et al, supra note 21.  George J. Annas, head of the health law 
department at the Boston University School of Public Health, explained, “I’d argue you can’t do 
studies ethically in a country where there is no basic healthcare…You can tell a person there that 
this is research, but they hear they have a chance to get care or else refuse their only good chance 
at care.  How can you put them in that position and then say they are giving informed consent?”  
Id. 
30 See Dominguez-Urban, supra note 1, at 273. 
31 The Nuremberg Code, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 3 (George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992). 
32 Declaration of Helsinki Recommendations Guiding Doctors in Clinical Research, in THE NAZI 
DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 331 – 42 
(George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992). 
33 See Dominguez-Urban, supra note 1, at 273 – 74. 
34 See Dominguez-Urban, supra note 1, at 275 - 76.  
8 
does it hold the perpetrators accountable.  It is further limited by the fact that FDA regulators 
often only inspect a foreign research site after the company has submitted its new drug 
application, “often years after the trial ceased.”
35 
  Just as Senator Javits once called for a federal mandate on research ethics due to the lack 
of state regulation, commentators have similarly proposed that the FDA extraterritorially extend 
its domestic human subject protections to apply to foreign research.
36  Under an extraterritorial 
                                                 
35 Harris, supra note 9. 
36 See Dubois, supra note 2, at 165.  Cf. Dominguez-Urban, supra note 1, at 245 (“How do 
nations achieve this goal [ensuring safe and effective drugs] yet still ensure that research costs 
are not prohibitive?  The trend has been to move beyond national borders in order to find 
solutions to this dilemma.”).  More generally, activists have called for states to use their 
influence extraterritorially in order to prevent human rights abuses abroad.  See Christen 
Broecker, “Better the Devil You Know”: Home State Approaches to Transnational Corporate 
Accountability, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 159, 180 – 81 (2008).  Other proposed solutions 
include the imposition of civil liability through the Alien Tort Claims Act on companies that fail 
to obtain patients’ informed consent, see Samantha Evans, The Globalization of Drug Testing: 
Enforcing Informed Consent Through the Alien Tort Claims Act, 19 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 
477 (2005), the creation of an international body to enforce binding ethical standards on a global 
scale, see Ruqaiijah Yearby, Good Enough to Use for Research, But Not Good Enough to Benefit 
from the Results of that Research, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1127, 1150 (2004), or the use of market 
exclusion in lucrative markets to deter unethical research. See Fazal Khan, The Human Factor: 
Globalizing Ethical Standards in Drug Trials Through Market Exclusion, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 
877, 902 (2008).  
9 
FDA, human research in foreign territory conducted in order to market drugs in the United States 
would not only be subject to host country regulations, but also to the FDA’s domestic standards 
for informed consent.  An extraterritorial FDA would not simply reject bad data, but would 
subject foreign sponsors and researchers who sought to its obtain approval for new drugs to the 
same liabilities, including injunction proceedings and criminal prosecutions, as domestic 
investigators.
37  This approach would mirror previous U.S. attempts to fill gaps in international 
law with extraterritorial domestic statutes.
38  Moreover, in regulating foreign clinical trials, the 
FDA would comprise just a part of an overall trend towards “transnational regulatory 
litigation,”
39 in which U.S. officials and agencies have increasingly applied American regulations 
to conduct occurring abroad.
40 
  Scholars have previously examined whether, under American law, the FDA could 
extraterritorially regulate pharmaceutical testing conducted overseas in order to market a drug 
                                                 
37 Such a strategy would avoid unpredictable and potentially frivolous ATCA lawsuits, require 
far less time than establishing and legitimizing an international body, and provide a greater 
degree of accountability for violators than mere market exclusion.  See supra note 36. 
38 See Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 93 MINN. L. 
REV. 815, 841 – 42 (2009) (the author is critical of this development). 
39 Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 251, 255 (2006). 
40 See Parrish, supra note 38, at  847 – 49.  This trend toward extraterritorial application of U.S. 
domestic law has occurred in areas as diverse as antitrust, intellectual property, securities, 
corporate governance, crime, labor, and the environment.  Id.  
10 
within the United States.
41  However, no scholar has yet examined whether the FDA could 
extraterritorially regulate this kind of foreign clinical research consistent with international law.  
Under international law, a state has a limited legal power to exercise legislative authority, 
primarily on the basis of territory and nationality.
42  Current FDA policy, which makes 
adherence to its informed consent requirement a condition of acceptance for foreign research, 
does not violate these limits.  It does not attempt to legislate in foreign territory, but merely 
articulates the FDA’s own standards for admissible research.  However, extraterritorial 
application of the FDA’s clinical trial regulations to foreign research, enforced through 
injunctions or criminal prosecutions, would prescribe law to govern conduct by non-Americans 
in foreign territory, and thus might exceed the United States’ legal power under international 
law.   
  So, even if American law permitted the FDA to regulate foreign research trials, would the 
application of the FDA’s informed consent requirement abroad still violate the international 
legal prohibition on extraterritorial jurisdiction?  Legal analysis of this question would not only 
determine the doctrinal validity of such a regulation, but also may help resolve the uniquely 
difficult policy issues posed by the regulation of foreign human experimentation.  Opposition to 
the “exploitation of subaltern populations” by pharmaceutical companies would counsel in favor 
                                                 
41 See Dubois, supra note 2, at 189 – 94. This analysis involved the application of the 
“presumption against extraterritoriality” canon to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, id. 
at 189 – 91, followed by an examination of whether the “effects test” exception included the 
specific drug safety and efficacy concerns addressed by the FDA.  Id. at 192 – 94. 
42 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES pt. IV, ch. 1, 
subch. A, intro. note (1987).  
11 
of an extraterritorial FDA.
43  Yet one could equally object to extraterritorial regulation based on 
the centrality of public health policy to national sovereignty, and the danger of imposing 
culturally constructed conceptions of informed consent through “ethical imperialism.”
44  
International law, which “has long recognized limitations on the authority of states to exercise 
jurisdiction to prescribe in circumstances affecting the interests of other states,”
45 could provide a 
first step toward unraveling these knots.  Thus, this paper will examine whether, and to what 
extent, the FDA could enforce its informed consent requirement on human experimentation 
conducted abroad consistent with the international legal limits on prescriptive jurisdiction.  
II. The International Law of Prescriptive Jurisdiction 
  According to the United Nations Report of the International Law Commission, 
“[t]raditionally the exercise of jurisdiction by a State was primarily limited to persons, property 
and acts within its territory.”
46  However, in the modern era, the exercise of “extraterritorial 
jurisdiction by a State with respect to persons, property or acts outside its territory has become an 
increasingly common phenomenon.”
47  International law provides the bases and limitations for a 
state’s “jurisdiction to prescribe” – the authority of a state “to make its law applicable to the 
                                                 
43 Khan, supra note 36, at 878. 
44 Dominguez-Urban, supra note 1, at 280. 
45 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES pt. IV, ch. 1, 
subch. A, intro. note (1987). 
46 U.N. Int'l Law Comm'n, Report of the International Law Commission, Annex E, at 516, U.N. 
Doc. A/61/10 (2006). 
47 Id.  
12 
activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of persons in things.”
48  These bases and 
limitations “flow from the sovereign equality of states and the principle of non-interference.”
49   
In most cases, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to three kinds of 
conduct: conduct that takes place within its territory, the conduct of its nationals, and conduct 
outside its territory that has or is intended to have a substantial effect within its territory or that is 
directed against its security.
50  A state may also prescribe law with respect to the activities of 
                                                 
48 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401 (1987). 
The Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States describes the tenants of 
“international law as it applies to the United States.” Id. § 1.  Although commentators have 
criticized certain provisions, see, e.g., Kathleen Hixson, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the 
Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 12 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 127 
(1988), American courts have repeatedly cited the Restatement’s sections on prescriptive 
jurisdiction as an accurate articulation of international law.  See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. 
California, 509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993); U.S. v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 840 (9th Cir. 
1994); U.S. v. Javino, 960 F.2d 1137, 1142 (2d Cir. 1992). 
49 Donald Francis Donovan & Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recognition of Universal Civil 
Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 142, 142 (2006). 
50 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 (1987).  
Additionally, there is an emerging “passive personality” basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction, 
under which states may apply their criminal laws to foreign acts if their nationals were victims of 
those acts. Id. § 402 cmt. g.  However, because the passive personality principle has not yet been 
“generally accepted,” id., this paper will not address it.  
13 
foreign branches of corporations incorporated under its laws.
51  However, even when one or 
more of these bases for jurisdiction is present, a state still may not exercise prescriptive 
jurisdiction in matters connected to another state “when the exercise of such jurisdiction is 
unreasonable.”
52  The determination of whether the exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable 
requires evaluation of “all relevant factors,” including, where appropriate: (1) the link of the 
activity to the territory of the regulating state; (2) the connections between the regulating state 
and the party responsible for the regulated activity, or between the regulating state and those 
whom the regulation protects; (3) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of 
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the 
degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted; (4) the existence of 
justified expectations that might affected by the regulation; (5) the importance of the regulation 
to the international system; (6) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions 
of the international system; (7) the extent to which another state may have an interest in 
regulating the activity; and (8) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
53  
When it would not be unreasonable for two states to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over 
particular conduct, but their regulations are in conflict, one state should defer to the other if it has 
the “clearly greater” interest.
54  Finally, in the case of regulatory statutes that prescribe both civil 
                                                 
51 Id. § 414(1). 
52 Id. § 403(1). 
53 Id. § 403(2).  
54 Id. § 403(3).  
14 
and criminal liability, the presence of “substantial foreign elements” should “weigh against 
application of criminal law.”
55   
“Universal jurisdiction” provides a special exception to the required bases for 
jurisdiction.  Even absent any of the traditional bases, states may exercise universal jurisdiction 
to prescribe punishment for “offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal 
concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and 
perhaps certain acts of terrorism.”
56  Historically, universal jurisdiction was intended to address 
offenses like piracy that defied traditional territorial jurisdictional principles, but in modern times 
it has also come to rely on “the sheer heinousness of certain crimes, such as genocide and 
torture.”
57  The offenses subject to universal jurisdiction comprise an “[e]xpanding class,” 
determined by “universal condemnation of those activities and general interest in cooperating to 
suppress them, as reflected in widely-accepted international agreements and resolutions of 
international organizations.”
58    
III. Current FDA Regulation of Informed Consent in Human Clinical Testing 
  To obtain approval to market a new drug in the United States, a manufacturer must first 
submit a new drug application (NDA) to the FDA.
59  As part of this application, the 
manufacturer must provide “substantial evidence” on the basis of “adequate and well-controlled 
                                                 
55 Id. § 403, cmt. f. 
56 Id. § 404. 
57 Donovan & Roberts, supra note 49, at 143. 
58 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404, cmt. a 
(1987). 
59 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2008); see also HUTT ET AL., supra note 5, at 624.  
15 
investigations, including clinical investigations” that the drug is both safe and effective.
60  
Clinical studies conducted within the United States in support of an NDA must proceed through 
the FDA’s extensively regulated investigational new drug (IND) process,
61 which prescribes a 
set of responsibilities and experimental protocols for both the investigators performing the 
research and their corporate sponsors.
62  Investigators must ensure that an institutional review 
board oversees and approves their research activities for compliance with community ethical 
standards and FDA regulations.
63  Moreover, an investigator working under an IND must obtain 
the informed consent of each human subject participating in the study.
64  The FDA requires that 
consent be sought under circumstances in which the subject has “sufficient opportunity to 
consider whether or not to participate and that minimize the possibility of coercion or undue 
influence.”
65  As part of the informed consent process, researchers must provide each subject 
with up to sixteen elements of information regarding the study
66 “in language understandable to 
                                                 
60 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2008). 
61 21 C.F.R. § 312 (2010).  The IND requirement for domestic clinical testing is premised on the 
FDA’s ability to exempt a manufacturer from the typical prohibition on shipping unapproved 
drugs for the limited purpose of clinical research.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (2008). 
62 21 C.F.R. § 312.50 – 70 (2010). 
63 21 C.F.R. § 312.66 (2010). 
64 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(i)(4) (2008); 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (2010); see also 21 C.F.R. § 312.60 
(2010). 
65 Id. 
66 See 21 C.F.R. § 50.25 (2010).  These elements include, inter alia, a statement that the study 
involves research and an explanation of its purposes, a description of the procedures to be  
16 
the subject.”
67  Each subject’s consent must be documented in a signed form, and each subject 
must receive a copy of his or her form.
68  The FDA further requires that researchers take special 
account of whether child subjects are capable of providing assent, and that they obtain the 
permission of the children’s parents or guardians.
69  The sponsors of new drug research under an 
IND are held responsible for monitoring the progress of the clinical studies and ensuring that all 
FDA requirements, including the informed consent standards, are met.
70  The Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act classifies violation of the informed consent requirement as a “prohibited 
act,”
71 against which the FDA has the power to bring an injunction proceeding
72 or a criminal 
prosecution.
73 
A manufacturer who intends to sponsor or conduct a clinical research study abroad in 
support of its NDA has two routes through which to submit the required data.  First, the 
manufacturer can voluntarily submit to the IND process, “bringing the investigator, regardless of 
                                                 
followed, a description of any reasonably foreseeable risks, a description of any reasonably 
foreseeable benefits, a disclosure of appropriate alternative procedures, a statement that 
participation is voluntary, and an explanation of whom to contact for answers to questions about 
the research and the subject’s rights.  See 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a) (2010). 
67 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (2010). 
68 21 C.F.R. § 50.27(a) (2010). 
69 See 21 C.F.R. § 50.55(b) & (e) (2010). 
70 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.56 (2010). 
71 21 U.S.C. § 331(e) (2008). 
72 See 21 U.S.C. § 332 (2008). 
73 See 21 U.S.C. § 333 (2008).  
17 
the location of the research, under the federal regulations governing the conduct of research in 
the United States,” including the informed consent provisions.
74  Second, the manufacturer may 
avoid the IND procedure altogether and instead conduct its foreign clinical studies independently 
in accordance with local ethical and legal requirements.
75  Under this alternative process, the 
FDA does not regulate or oversee the research, nor does it assign responsibilities to investigators 
or their sponsors.  Instead, the FDA simply requires as a condition for acceptance of the study
76 
that it be “conducted in accordance with good clinical practice,” which includes “obtaining and 
documenting the freely given informed consent of the subject.”
77  The FDA will not accept as 
support for an NDA studies that fail to meet this informed consent requirement, although it will 
still “examine data from such a study.”
78  The term “good clinical practice” (GCP) refers to the 
guidelines for human experimentation promulgated in 1995
79 by the International Conference on 
Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, 
an international conference convened by the United States, Japan, and the European Union in an 
                                                 
74 Erin Talati, An Open Door to Ending Exploitation: Accountability for Violations of Informed 
Consent Under the Alien Tort Statute, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 231, 240 (2006). 
75 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.120(a) (2010). 
76 21 C.F.R. § 312.120(a)(1) (2010).  
77 21 C.F.R. § 312.120(a)(1)(i) (2010). 
78 21 C.F.R. § 312.120(a)(2) (2010). 
79 International Conference on Harmonization: Draft Guidelines on Good Clinical Practice, 60 
Fed. Reg. 42,948 (1995).  See also Michelle D. Miller, The Informed-Consent Policy of the 
International Conference on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Registration of 
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, 30 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 203, 233 – 34 (1997).  
18 
attempt to standardize their pharmaceutical development protocols.
80  The FDA also requires, as 
part of the GCP, that foreign research studies receive review and approval by an “independent 
ethics committee,”
81 which operates much like an institutional review board.
82   
The FDA’s informed consent regulations for research conducted under the guidance of an 
IND impose more stringent patient protections than does the GCP for foreign research conducted 
independently.
83  Although the FDA’s IND human subject protections claim to extend to any 
research filed in support of an NDA,
84 the language of the IND informed consent requirement,
85 
and the fact that the FDA articulates a separate GCP standard for independent foreign studies, 
together suggest that the FDA regulations contemplate distinct informed consent standards for 
each research pathway.  In the IND process, the FDA prescribes specific components of 
“informed consent,” including the language used, the precise information provided, and the 
circumstances under which consent may be given.
86  On the contrary, for independent foreign 
research, the GCP requires only that researchers inform each subject “of all aspects of the trial 
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that are relevant to the subject’s decision to participate” and document his or her consent “by 
means of a written informed consent form.”
87  Under these “extremely vague” tenants, research 
subjects “have significantly less assurance that actual informed consent will be obtained.”
88  
Moreover, the FDA subjects each pathway to different levels of enforcement, with different 
consequences for violation of the informed consent standard.  The FDA is authorized to bring,
89 
and has sent warning letters threatening to initiate,
90 injunction proceedings and criminal 
prosecutions against investigators and sponsors who conduct research under an IND and fail to 
fulfill its informed consent requirements.  Yet FDA regulations present the GCP informed 
consent standard for independent foreign research as merely a condition of acceptance for the 
study,
91 so that a violation of the requirement will merely disqualify its results from an NDA 
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without the imposition of further penalties.  Finally, foreign institutional review boards, lacking 
information and guidance, often fail to understand international research requirements and 
instead hold drug companies to a lower standard.
92 
IV. International Legal Limits on the Extraterritorial Regulation of Human Experimentation 
  An extraterritorial FDA would apply its higher IND informed consent requirements to 
independent research conducted abroad in support of an NDA.  Foreign investigators and 
sponsors who violated these standards – whether discovered upon submission of their data, 
through a whistleblower, or during an on-site inspection – would be subject to injunction 
proceedings and criminal prosecution in the United States.  Alternatively, an extraterritorial FDA 
could continue to hold foreign researchers and sponsors to its lower GCP informed consent 
requirements, but, rather than simply reject flawed studies, instead actively enforce these 
standards through injunctions and criminal proceedings.  
  A.  Bases of Jurisdiction 
  The FDA would have to premise its extraterritorial regulation of foreign clinical trials on 
one of the internationally accepted bases of jurisdiction to prescribe.
93  Of course, foreign 
research does not take place within United States territory and thus would not invoke the 
territorial basis for jurisdiction.
94  Nationality could provide a basis for the FDA to regulate the 
foreign clinical trials sponsored by American companies or conducted by American investigators 
                                                 
92 See Food and Drug Administration, NIH Sees More Ethical Problems with Foreign IRBs; 
Steps Up Training, FDA WEEK, Mar. 17, 2006. 
93 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 402, 
414(1) (1987). 
94 See id. § 402(1)(a).  
21 
abroad.
95  The FDA might also be able to regulate research conducted or sponsored by foreign 
branches of American pharmaceutical companies.  However, the nationality and foreign branch 
bases would not allow the FDA to regulate the many foreign research trials that are funded and 
performed by non-U.S. nationals.   
  To apply its informed consent requirements to foreign investigators or sponsors 
conducting human subject research abroad, the FDA would have to rely on the effect basis for 
jurisdiction.
96  In this case, the “effect” would be the FDA’s approval of the NDA and the 
marketing of the drug, researched in violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act’s 
informed consent requirement, within the United States.  The sale of such a drug would violate 
the “sense of responsibility” Senator Javits suggested the nation feel in regards to the issue of 
informed consent,
97 and potentially make the American public morally complicit in the 
consumption of an unethically researched drug.
98  However, the FDA would face three principal 
difficulties in justifying its extraterritorial regulation on this basis – the discovery of flawed 
research before approval of the NDA, the nature of the “effect” of prohibited research within 
U.S. territory, and the degree of that “effect.”   
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The first issue the FDA would face in premising its extraterritorial jurisdiction on the 
effect basis is that, if the FDA discovered the informed consent violations before approving the 
drug for marketing, the prohibited research would never have had any actual “effect” within the 
United States.  However, the effect basis would still justify FDA jurisdiction over these cases.  
International law permits extraterritorial jurisdiction in cases involving intended but unrealized 
domestic effect.
99  So long as “the intent to commit the proscribed act is clear and demonstrated 
by some activity, and the effect to be produced by the activity is substantial and foreseeable, the 
fact that a plan or conspiracy was thwarted does not deprive the target state of jurisdiction to 
make its law applicable.”
100  For instance, the fact that a plan coordinated in Pakistan to bomb 
American commercial airliners “did not come to fruition” did not “wrest jurisdiction over the 
prosecution from [an American] court,” since the “alleged crimes clearly had intended effects on 
the United States and its citizens.”
101  Similarly, flawed foreign research discovered before 
approval of the NDA would still have had an intended domestic effect – the intent of obtaining 
FDA approval and selling the tested drug in the United States.  Thus, so long as foreign 
investigators and sponsors conducted their study with the demonstrable intent of supporting an 
NDA for marketing a drug within the United States, the FDA could legitimately exercise 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over the research. 
The second concern – the unique nature of the domestic “effect” of foreign research 
conducted without its participants’ informed consent – poses a far more difficult obstacle to the 
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FDA’s extraterritorial jurisdiction.  Although foreign drug research presents a number of 
potential regulatory challenges for the FDA,
102 a clinical study in which foreign investigators 
failed to obtain their subjects’ consent would have no material “effect” within the United States.  
As one scholar explained, “The health of U.S. consumers will not be affected by a lack of 
consent by a patient in a developing-country hospital.  The U.S. marketplace suffers no harm if 
the potential side effects of a drug are not explained to research subjects.”
103  Instead, the 
domestic “effect” of such research could only be characterized as a moral one – Americans 
would be consuming drugs proven safe and effective, and approved for U.S. marketing, on the 
basis of clinical studies conducted contrary to the nation’s fundamental ethical values.   
Yet the effect basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction did not originate, nor has it come to be 
accepted, as applicable to the kind of moral complicity inflicted through the unethical production 
of goods abroad for domestic consumption.  Instead, the effect basis refers to tangible physical or 
economic effects.  In one of the earliest cases to employ the effect principle,
104 the Permanent 
Court of International Justice held that Turkey had jurisdiction to charge a French sailor with 
manslaughter after he negligently collided his boat with a Turkish ship.
105  Under international 
law, each vessel was considered assimilated to the territory of the country whose flag it flew.
106  
Yet the court held that, although the offense had “its origin on board the Lotus [the French 
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ship],” Turkish jurisdiction was legitimately implicated because “its effects made themselves felt 
on board the Boz-Kourt [the Turkish ship].”
107  It explained, in a widely adopted holding,
108 that 
“offences, the authors of which at the moment of commission are in the territory of another State, 
are nevertheless to be regarded as having been committed in the national territory, if one of the 
constituent elements of the offence, and more especially its effects, have taken place there.”
109  
The domestic effect of regulated foreign conduct need not constitute direct violence, but also 
could comprise more general harm.  For instance, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly approved the 
extraterritorial application of U.S. statutes prohibiting the importation and distribution of 
controlled substances due to the detrimental effects such materials produce in the United 
States.
110  Moreover, states may regulate foreign activities due to their domestic economic 
impact.  Although a source of controversy,
111 “[m]ost other states of Western Europe…as well as 
Canada and Japan…have accepted the effects doctrine as applied to economic effects.”
112  As a 
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result, “substantial litigation has arisen under the [effect basis] in the fields of antitrust, 
securities, and trademark.”
113   
Yet even under these broader readings of the effect basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction, 
the foreign conduct has always caused or enabled physical or economic harm within the 
regulating state’s territory – in contrast to the “moral” injury inflicted by the domestic marketing 
of drugs approved via unethical research.  In an analysis of whether the regulation of foreign 
clinical studies would satisfy the United States’ domestic law version of the effect basis,
114 one 
scholar noted simply, “There is no effects test basis for regulating the safety of human 
subjects.”
115  International law likely compels the same conclusion.  The material effect of 
experimentation without informed consent manifests only in the territory where the research 
occurs.  The marketing of immorally produced goods in the United States creates no tangible 
effect that international law could recognize as validly implicating FDA jurisdiction over foreign 
research.  Commentators have speculated that because the Restatement addresses extraterritorial 
antitrust and securities cases in separate provisions, “the general area of effects jurisdiction now 
stands free,” which could “substantially relax[] limitations on a state’s permissible exercise of 
effects jurisdiction.”
116  Nevertheless, at best, an assertion that unethical foreign research 
produces a cognizable effect within United States territory by enabling the domestic sale of drugs 
tested in violation of the country’s moral values would be a novel take on international law.  
                                                 
113 Wade Estey, The Five Bases of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the Failure of the 
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 21 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 177, 186 (1997). 
114 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945). 
115 Dubois, supra note 2, at 194. 
116 Hixson, supra note 48, at 147.  
26 
Especially considering the controversy that accompanied the expansion of the effect basis to 
cover economic impacts, the notion of a “moral effect” would be unlikely to survive the rigorous 
“unreasonableness” limitation discussed below. 
Finally, even if unethically conducted foreign research had a recognized moral effect 
within the United States, this effect might not be sufficiently “substantial” to justify FDA 
jurisdiction.  The requirement that foreign conduct have a “substantial” effect within the 
regulating state’s territory
117 checks a state’s ability to interpret the effect basis for 
extraterritorial jurisdiction too broadly.
118  For instance, the French penal code adopts an “Effects 
Principle” with regard to extraterritorial jurisdiction.
119  However, the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York found that French professional secrecy laws did not 
apply to a civil discovery request for the audit documents of an American company, initially 
produced at the request of French accounting firms, due to the trivial impact of such a disclosure 
on the French firms.
120  It is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify whether the moral effect of 
unethical foreign research submitted to market drugs in the United States would be sufficiently 
“substantial” to invoke FDA jurisdiction.  Nevertheless, the non-material nature of the effect 
would appear fairly weak alongside the real world economic and political concerns urging 
against extraterritorial regulation.  Thus, even if one accepted that unethical foreign research 
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conducted in support of an NDA had a legitimate effect within the United States, the requirement 
that this effect be “substantial” would pose another daunting obstacle for the FDA. 
B.  “Unreasonableness” Limitation 
Even if the FDA successfully grounded its extraterritorial application of the informed 
consent requirement on the nationality, foreign branch, or effect bases, it would still have to 
demonstrate that the exercise of this jurisdiction would not be “unreasonable.”
121   In 
international law, this additional limitation serves as a “legitimating principle,”
122 since it 
qualifies extraterritorial jurisdiction through a mandate that “states must have a legitimate 
purpose for regulating acts that transcend their boundaries, and [that] they must exercise their 
powers proportionately.”
123  A “mere factual connection” between foreign drug testing and the 
United States established through the nationality, foreign branch, or effect bases is not enough.  
The FDA must legitimate its prescriptive authority by demonstrating that the exercise of its 
power to impose the informed consent requirement abroad would not be unreasonable.
124 
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Even interpreted in favor of the FDA’s extraterritorial jurisdiction, the majority of the 
factors that comprise the unreasonableness limitation weigh heavily against regulation of foreign 
research.  The FDA might be able to satisfy the first three factors.  The first factor, the link of the 
activity to the territory of the regulating state, examines the extent to which the activity takes 
place within the regulating state’s territory or has a “substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect” 
within its territory.
125  Although foreign clinical trials by definition do not occur in the United 
States, a lack of informed consent in foreign research, as already stated, could conceivably 
produce an abstract, moral effect within American borders.  The second factor scrutinizes the 
connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state 
and the person responsible for the regulated activity or those whom the regulation is designed to 
protect.
126  American investigators or American corporate sponsors who conduct overseas 
research would fulfill the first part of this factor.  However, extraterritorial regulation of foreign 
drug testing would be principally designed to protect non-U.S. national test subjects, and would 
not satisfy the second part of this analysis.  Under the third factor, states must consider the 
importance of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such 
activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted.
127  
The FDA might regard extraterritorial regulation of human experimentation as an important 
moral imperative, especially considering the lack of such regulation in developing countries.  
The international codes on human experimentation reflect the general desirability of informed 
consent requirements. 
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However, the remaining five factors would pose an insurmountable barrier of 
“unreasonableness” for the FDA’s extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign drug testing.  The 
fourth factor examines the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by 
the regulation.
128  Considering the long history of strictly national regulation of human drug 
testing, the lack of international treaties on the issue, and the fact that drug companies conduct 
their tests overseas precisely to avoid the FDA’s stringent domestic testing regulations, it seems 
that pharmaceutical corporations and scientific investigators have justified expectations that they 
would be free to conduct their studies abroad without the FDA’s extraterritorial interference.  
Despite its moral desirability, extraterritorial regulation would also fail the fifth consideration, 
the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic system,
129 since 
testing without informed consent does not pose a global threat.  The sixth factor, the extent to 
which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international system,
130 would 
similarly weigh against FDA authority, as there is no precedent in international law for the 
extraterritorial regulation of scientific research.  The final two suggested factors would pose the 
most difficult obstacles.  The seventh examines the extent to which another state may have an 
interest in regulating the activity.
131  Public health is a traditional concern of the sovereign 
state,
132 and foreign nations thus have a powerful interest in regulating the human clinical 
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research that occurs within their borders.  By the same logic, the eighth factor, the likelihood of 
conflict with regulation by another state,
133 suggests that FDA jurisdiction over drug testing 
abroad would unduly interfere with foreign states’ own regulations.  
The Second Circuit previously reached a similar conclusion when it held that American 
firearm regulations could not apply to foreign weapon manufacturers, “[i]n light of the 
substantial interests that other countries have in regulating the manufacture of firearms within 
their own borders.”
134  Given the direct danger that a foreign-made firearm might pose to the 
United States, as opposed to the more abstract concern over unethical foreign research, it is 
extremely unlikely that extraterritorial regulation of drug testing abroad could be considered 
acceptable under international law.  The additional weight applied against the extraterritorial 
application of criminal liability in situations with substantial foreign elements,
135 as is the case 
with foreign clinical research, creates a final obstacle that the FDA could not overcome.  Even if 
legitimately premised on a nationality, foreign branch, or effect basis, the extraterritorial 
application of the FDA’s informed consent requirements to human subject research abroad 
would likely be considered unreasonable, and thus prohibited under international law, due to the 
unprecedented nature of such regulation and the substantial interests foreign states have in 
governing their own public health concerns.   
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C.  Universal Jurisdiction 
  Although the FDA would lack the authority to apply its informed consent requirement 
abroad under the traditional bases and limitations on prescriptive jurisdiction, it may be able to 
bring criminal prosecutions against foreign investigators and sponsors, regardless of whether 
they intend to submit an NDA, through the principle of “universal jurisdiction.”
136  In order to do 
so, human experimentation without the participants’ informed consent would have to constitute a 
“universal offense,” which would be “subject to universal jurisdiction as a matter of customary 
international law.”
137  The Second Circuit recently addressed this very issue in a claim brought 
under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).
138  The ATS grants the district courts subject matter 
jurisdiction over torts brought by aliens for violations of the “law of nations”
139 – a kind of 
universal civil jurisdiction
140 that allows federal courts to hear claims for violations of “well-
established, universally recognized” norms of international law.
141   In Abdullahi v. Pfizer, 
Inc.,
142 the Second Circuit heard an ATS claim brought by a group of Nigerian children and their 
guardians against the American pharmaceutical company Pfizer, alleging that the company had 
conducted clinical studies of the antibiotic drug Trovan on children in Nigeria without disclosing 
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the experimental nature of the research or the risks involved.
143  Eleven children allegedly died 
as a result of the study, and many more were injured.
144  The Second Circuit found that the ATS 
granted it jurisdiction over the Nigerian plaintiffs’ claim, as medical experimentation without 
patients’ informed consent constituted a universal offense.
145  The court conducted a thorough 
review of the history of the informed consent standard in international law, beginning with the 
prosecution of Nazi doctors at Nuremberg who conducted medical experiments without their 
subjects’ consent, moving through various international treaties that address human subject 
research such as the Fourth Geneva Convention and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, and finally examining legislation in the United States and Europe that enforces 
the informed consent requirement.
146  It concluded, “the norm prohibiting nonconsensual 
medical experimentation on human subjects has become firmly embedded and has secured 
universal acceptance in the community of nations.”
147 
  According to the Second Circuit’s reasoning and historical analysis, nonconsensual 
human experimentation constitutes a sufficiently fundamental violation of international norms 
that the FDA could bring criminal prosecutions under universal jurisdiction against any 
investigator or sponsor who failed to obtain their subjects’ informed consent during research 
abroad.  Not only could the FDA bring prosecutions against foreign researchers and sponsors 
without regard for the territorial or nationality bases for jurisdiction, but also the unlimited nature 
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of universal jurisdiction would permit the FDA to criminally prosecute investigators and 
sponsors who had no intent of even submitting an NDA to market their drugs in the United 
States.  The only constraint on the FDA’s authority to prosecute these researchers under 
universal jurisdiction would be the severity of their violations.  The Second Circuit emphasized 
that the Nigerian plaintiffs had alleged a “complete failure” on the part of the investigators to 
inform their subjects of the existence of the experiments.
148  The court noted, “we do not suggest 
that [the international prohibition on nonconsensual medical experimentation] would extend to 
instances of routine or isolated failures by medical professionals to obtain informed consent, 
such as those arising from simple negligence.”
149  Thus, the FDA could not invoke universal 
jurisdiction for violations of its more stringent, domestic informed consent requirements, since 
the international norm that the Second Circuit identified does not demand such a strict standard.  
Instead, the FDA would have to rely on its lower GCP standard, as this more basic mandate that 
investigators simply obtain their subjects’ consent and inform them of the study
150 coincides with 
the fundamental norm identified by the Second Circuit.  Nevertheless, if one accepts the Second 
Circuit’s declaration that human testing without the subjects’ consent constitutes a crime against 
humanity, then the FDA could prosecute foreign researchers and sponsors who violated this 
fundamental requirement of international law through an assertion of universal jurisdiction. 
V. Conclusion 
  The globalization of the pharmaceutical industry has increasingly incentivized drug 
companies to move their clinical research abroad.  Particularly in the developing world, this 
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change has made ethics oversight and human subject protection more difficult, and has resulted 
in disturbing reports of investigators conducting human experimentation without their 
participants’ informed consent.  Commentators have suggested that the FDA could extend its 
domestic informed consent requirements extraterritorially in order to regulate foreign drug 
testing.  The international legal limits on states’ prescriptive jurisdiction would prohibit such an 
exercise of FDA regulatory authority if it sought to enforce its stringent domestic informed 
consent requirements abroad.   However, the FDA could invoke the principle of universal 
jurisdiction in order to bring extraterritorial criminal prosecutions against researchers and 
sponsors who utterly failed to meet internationally accepted informed consent standards. 
  The results of this analysis suggest two conclusions – one positive and one normative.  In 
terms of positive law, the international legal order does not permit states to regulate foreign 
activities such as clinical research simply because they regard those activities as unethical and 
feel morally implicated as a result of their economic involvement.  Although some commentators 
have called for states to impose extraterritorial human rights regulations on the multinational 
corporations headquartered within their territory,
151 traditional international limits on prescriptive 
jurisdiction pose a legal obstacle to such an endeavor.  Instead, the international community must 
unanimously condemn certain acts in order for states to bring extraterritorial criminal 
prosecutions under the principle of universal jurisdiction.  In order to remain consistent with 
other tenants of international law, activists who seek to charge businesses with human rights 
responsibilities must begin with universally accepted human rights standards that would allow 
states more jurisdictional flexibility for their extraterritorial enforcement.  
                                                 
151 See Broecker, supra note 36, at 178 – 87.  
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The international law of jurisdiction may also suggest a normative position on the 
difficult policy question of whether Western governments should impose their own notions of 
medical ethics on developing countries.  The preceding analysis demonstrated that the FDA may 
not impose its stringent IND informed consent requirements on research abroad, but could 
prosecute foreign investigators who failed to fulfill the more basic GCP standard under universal 
jurisdiction.  Similarly, Western countries might consider insisting on some baseline human 
subject protections for foreign research, such as the Nuremberg Code or the Declaration of 
Helsinki, but also allow developing countries to implement those protections in accordance with 
their own unique cultural, political, and economic contexts.  This approach would allow Western 
governments to respect foreign cultures, while also maintaining their fundamental commitment 
to human rights.  Given the tension between the respect for states’ sovereign authority and the 
protection of individual autonomy, FDA officials who seek to enforce the informed consent 
requirement abroad while staying within the bounds of international law may have to search for 
another means to ensure this principle of scientific ethics in the developing world. 